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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies employers' search by analyzing the duration of vacancies notified 
at public employment offices. It appears that employers use a nonsequential search 
strategy to find new employees. 

1. Introduction 
Search in the labour market has been a popular field of theoretical as 
well as empirical analysis in the past decades. Durations of search have been 
analyzed using the concept of hazard rates. Whereas job search has been 
investigated intensively, employers' search has been analyzed in only a few 
studies (Devine and Kiefer, 1990). In a recent study Van Ours and Ridder 
(1992) suggest that the search strategy of employers differs from the search 
strategy of jobseekers. Jobseekers search sequentially, that is they receive job 
offers one by one and decide on arrival of a job offer whether or not to accept 
that offer. Employers search mostly nonsequential, that is they collect job 
applications to form a pool of applicants and they piek the best applicant from 
the pool. 
This paper analyses vacancy duration data from public employment 
offices and presents a test to establish the search strategy of employers. 
2. Employers' search 
A vacancy hazard rate describes the rate by which vacancies are filled. 
Van Ours and Ridder (1992) study the search strategy of employers by analyzing 
the evolution of the vacancy hazard rate and the applicant arrival rate over the 
duration of the vacancy. Analyzing Dutch vacancy data, they find that the 
vacancy hazard rate is low in the first few weeks and increases afterwards to 
remain quite stable. The arrival rate of applicants is high in the first few weeks 
and is almost zero in the weeks thereafter. Apparently most applicants arrive in 
the period shortly after the vacancy has been announced, while few vacancies are 
filled during this period. From this they conclude that almost all vacancies are 
filled from a pool of applicants which is formed shortly after the posting of the 
vacancy. Therefore, vacancy durations should be interpreted mostly as selection 
periods and not as search periods for appUcants. Van Ours and Ridder (1993) 
explicitly decompose a vacancy duration into an application period and a 
selection period, analyzing the determinants of both periods. In their theoretical 
model they assume that employers choose the length of the application period 
which maximizes the expected discounted profit flow from employing a new 
worker. They find that the size of the flow of applicants has a negative effect on 
the length of the application period. In their empirical analysis they find that the 
application period is rather short, which again confirms their conclusion that 
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vacancy durations are mainly selection periods. 
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Figure 1 Duration dependence in notified vacancies data 
In this paper we analyze durations of vacancies notified at public 
employment offices. A previous analysis of these data showed that here also the 
vacancy hazard rate is low in the first few weeks and higher afterwards (Van 
Ours, 1994). This duration dependence pattern is illustrated in figure 1, which is 
constructed from a reestimation of the model used by Van Ours.1 Since the data 
do not contain information on numbers of applicants, the direct evidence of 
nonsequential employers' search is not very impressive. Furthermore, a stepwise 
increase of the vacancy hazard rate does not exclusively prove the existence of 
an application period foliowed by a selection period. 
'In this model the hazard rate is specified piecewise constant on specific intervals of duration, 
such that 
GCt) =exp(X'a+EJ(t)B), 
where 0(t) is the hazard rate at duration t, X is a vector of explanatory variables (a constant 
included), a is a vector of coefficients, E; is summation over the time intervals i (the reference 
interval excluded), I(t) is a duration dependency dummy that equals 1 if t lies in interval i, and 0 
otherwise, and B; is the corresponding coëfficiënt. Estimation results underlying figure 1 are 
presented in table 1. 
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A competing sequential search explanation of this phenomenon is that it 
takes some time before the employment office is able to match the information 
about the requirements of the vacant job and the information of relevant job 
seekers registered at the office. Once the information is matched the job seekers 
start visiting the sequential seeking employer, until the employer finds a suitable 
applicant in which case the vacancy is filled (assuming that the applicant accepts 
the job offer). This alternative explanation suggests that the length of the first 
period is determined by the information matching technology of the employment 
office, while the length of the second period is determined by the process of 
sequential search. The sequential search explanation also suggests that the ap-
plicant arrival rate is low in the first period and higher in the second period. 
The competing explanation of sequential employers' search is invalidated 
in the study by Van Ours and Ridder (1992) because they find a high applicant 
arrival rate in the first period and low one in the second period. 
The public employment office data we use do not allow a direct compa-
rison of both competing explanations, but they do allow an indirect comparison 
by studying the effect of the local labour market situation on the hazard rates 
describing the length of both periods. 
If the ratio of unemployed (U) to vacancies (V) is large, the applicant 
flow will be larger than with a small UV-ratio. Now, consider the effects of the 
UV-ratio in both cases. In the nonsequential case this ratio influences the inflow 
of job applicants in the first period: the higher the UV-ratio, the higher the 
applicant arrival rate and the shorter the application period. There is no influ-
ence on the second period, since the length of this period is determined by the 
selection technology of the employer. 
The effects of the UV-ratio in case of sequential search is different. The 
length of the first period depends on the information matching technology of the 
public employment office, so we expect no influence of the UV-ratio in this 
period. In a constant returns to scale labour market a higher UV-ratio leads to a 
higher applicant arrival rate in the second period. The hazard rate of the second 
period is equal to the product of the applicant arrival rate and the acceptance 
probability of the employer. In many studies on job search the effect of a higher 
job offer arrival rate on the hazard rate is considered to be ambiguous, since a 
higher job offer arrival rate lowers the offer acceptance probability. However, as 
Van den Berg (1990) shows, a higher job offer arrival rate has an unambiguous 
positive effect on the hazard rate. Assuming that this regularity also applies for 
sequential employers' search, we expect a higher UV-ratio to have a positive 
effect on the hazard rate of the second period. 
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So, if we compare the effects of the UV-ratio on the hazard rate X of 
the first period and the hazard rate 0 of the second period, we are able to 
distinguish between sequential and nonsequential employers' search: 
Sequential search: X=X(U/V, •) 
0 
0=0(U/V, •) 
+ 
Nonsequential search: X = X(U/V, •) 
+ 
0=0(U/V, •) 
o 
duration Cweeks^ -> 
D uv<10 + uv>30 
Figure 2 Empirical hazard rates for low and high UV vacancies (weekly intervals) 
A first impression of the effect of the UV ratio on the hazard rates can 
be obtained by comparing empirical hazard rate patterns for low (U/V<10) and 
high (U/V > 30) UV vacancies, which account for 24 and 26% of the total 
number of vacancies in our dataset, respectively. Figure 2 shows that the hazard 
rate is somewhat lower for low UV vacancies in the first few weeks after they 
are posted. Moving on in time, however, this image is troubled by increasing 
measurement errors in the empirical hazards. Thus, the most important 
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observation that can be done is that it is practically impossible to disentangle the 
effects of the UV ratio by just doing some explorative statistics. The next 
sections discuss a more stractural approach. 
3. Empiricaï model 
The modelling of sequential search is identical to that of nonsequential 
search. In either case, no vacancies are filled during the first period, due to 
information matching and the formation of a pool of applicants, respectively. 
Furthermore, in both cases vacancies are filled in the second period, due to the 
decisions of the sequentially seeking employer or the outcome of a selection 
process from the pool of applicants. So, while the modelling of both search 
strategies is the same, the interpretation of the parameters is fundamentally 
different. 
In order to get an empiricaï specification of these search processes, we 
make the following assumptions (Van Ours and Ridder, 1993). In line with both 
interpretations of the model we assume that no vacancies are filled during the 
first period. Once the second period has started, the processes in the first period, 
information matching or pool formation, are stopped. The length of the first 
period is, conditional on a heterogeneity component, exponentially distributed 
with parameter X. The same holds for the length of the second period with 
parameter 6. We will specify these parameters exponentially: X = eBX+A' and 6 = 
e
y
'
x+
". X is a vector of explanatory variables. (8 and 7 are vectors of parameters. 
fi and v are unmeasured heterogeneity terms that are assumed to be 
independently distributed with probability distributions g and h, respectively, 
such that 
(1) g(y) =1 / (1 +e") ify = Mi 
= e7( l + e") ify = M2 
= 0 otherwise, 
and 
h(y) = l / ( l + eT) ify = ^ 
= eV(l + eT) ify = v2 
= 0 otherwise, 
for some pu fi2, <*, vu v2, and r. Note that the expectation of the heterogeneity 
term does not necessarily equal zero, which makes a constant in X redundant. 
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Denote the length of the first period by A, and the length of the second 
period by B. Define the entire duration by T := A + B. The conditional 
distribution of A is given by iA\J,&) = ^Q>* ^ a>0, and 0 otherwise. 
Furthermore, it holds that fT|Ai„(t|a) = Öe-"(t"a) if t>a, and 0 otherwise. This 
implies that the sinmltaneous distribution of A and T is given by 
(2) W * ) -Wt l a)Wa)=Xöe ~"e -(X~e)i> 
if t>a, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, when \^6, the marginal distribution of T|p 
is given by 
t 
(3) fT|^(t) - 1 fAfT|ft,(a,t)da - J±. (e - - e "»), 
if t>0, and 0 otherwise. When X=0, however, T\n,v is gamma(2,X) = 
gamma(2,0) distributed. The density of observed total durations, fT, is obtained 
by mixing fT)/l), with respect to g and h, which gives fT(t) = 
Note that the marginal distribution in (3) is symmetrical in X and 0, so 
there is no ex ante possibility to link X to the first and 0 to the second period. 
However, the pattern of duration dependency found by Van Ours (1992) shows 
that the first period, in which no vacancies are filled, is rather short. In the 
nonsequential case this is supported by the fact that the Dutch labour market 
was a buyer's market during the period of data collection, which shortens the 
application period. In the sequential case we expect a short period since 
information matching is not a very time consuming activity. Therefore, 
identification of X(0) as the parameter of the first (second) period can be 
achieved by restricting X and 0 to satisfy X>0, i.e. in expectation A < B. 
4. Data and variables 
We use a sample from 5 local Dutch public employment offices of 501 
vacancies, who were notified in the first quarter of 1988 and refer to single - one 
person wanted - vacancies. For each vacancy we know the duration as measured 
by the time between the date of notification and the date the vacancy was filled 
(Van Ours, 1994, provides more information on the data). The employment 
offices also register job seekers, most of which are unemployed. The unemployed 
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workers are obliged to register at the public employment offices if they want to 
claim unemployment benefits. Unemployed may not all be equally motivated in 
accepting a job, if one is offered. Employers in the Netherlands frequently 
complain about the ability or motivation of the applicants send to them by the 
employment offices. Therefore in many cases employers use additional recruit-
ment channels. So, the process by which notified vacancies are filled does not 
only reflect interactions between employment office and employer but also 
reflect the use of other recruitment channels. 
The most important explanatory variable in our analysis is the UV-ratio, 
distinguished by occupation and region of the public employment office, which 
we specify as a natural logarithm. Of course, the UV-ratio is an explanatory 
variable for the hazard rates of both periods. 
For the hazard rate of the first period we also use dummy variables for 
the employment offices. In the sequential search case these variables reflect dif-
ferences in information matching technology between the offices. In the 
nonsequential case the dummy variables reflect local differences in employers' 
recruitment behaviour. 
For the hazard rate of the second period we investigate several possible 
determinants, referring to characteristics of the vacancy or the employer who 
notified the vacancy. We use dummy variables for: metal or construction 
workers, service occupations at a secondary or higher educational level 
(reference group: other vacancies), size of the firm, distinguishing 10-50, 50-100 
and > 100 employees (reference group: 0-10 employees), temporary job, parttime 
job, intensive mediation. 
The latter variable indicates which mediation method the employment 
office used to fill the vacancy. In case of intensive mediation vacancy information 
is matched with information about registered job seekers. Potentially suitable job 
seekers are notified about the vacancy. Sometimes, the office has an additional 
screening of the job seeker with respect to ability and motivation. In case of non-
intensive mediation the employment office is rather passive. Information on job 
vacancies is stored in files, to which job seekers haye access. Whether or not a 
job seeker applies is up to him or her. We expect intensive mediation to reduce 
the length of the second period. In both cases the quality of the applicants is 
improved, which may lead to a higher acceptance probability in case of 
sequential search or a shorter selection period in case of nonsequential search. 
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5. Estimation results 
We define the likelihood as the probability of the 501 independent (complete) 
durations according to the model developed in section 3. Thus, the likelihood is 
given by ü i f^ ) , where t;, i = 1..501, denote the observed durations. Maximizing 
this likelihood gives estimates of the relevant parameters. 
The estimation results are shown in table 2. The left column contains 
the estimation results without unobserved heterogeneity, the right column those 
with two point unobserved heterogeneity. Using sample averages and the 
parameter estimates in the left column we find that X represents an average 
duration of 0.5 weeks and 6 an average duration of 3.5 weeks. Furthermore, in 
only 10 out of 501 cases X was found to be smaller than 6. Thus, we conclude 
that X is the parameter of the first and 6 the parameter of the second period. We 
find no unobserved heterogeneity in the first period and a heterogeneity term in 
the second period which is only significant on a 10% level. Also, trom a com-
parison of the loglikelihoods it appears that the introduction of unobserved 
heterogeneity does not improve our estimation results significantly (likelihood 
ratio statistic: 2.0). Furthermore, note that the model performs better than the 
flexible duration dependency model presented in table 1 (it has a higher 
likelihood together with less degrees of f reedom). Our discussion of the 
estimation results is therefore restricted to the left column of table 2. 
It appears that the UV-ratio has a positive effect on the hazard rate of 
the first period, while having no effect on the hazard rate of the second period. 
From this we conclude that employers' search is nonsequential. In those cases 
where X was smaller than 6, the UV ratio was small, i.e. less than 3 (the sample 
average of the UV ratio is 23.4). Obviously, this concerns vacancies that were 
hard to fill because of a lack of potential applicants. Apart from differences in 
the UV-ratio the hazard rate of the application period is also different for 
different employment offices, probably reflecting differences in recruitment 
behaviour between employers in different regions. The only significant variable 
for the hazard rate of the selection period is the dummy for temporary job: the 
selection period for vacancies for temporary jobs is shorter than average, which 
seems quite obvious since the consequences of attracting a non suitable applicant 
are less serious for a temporary job than in case of a steady job. Workers on 
temporary jobs do not have to be fired and therefore do not involve firing costs. 
Intensive mediation has a positive but not significant effect on the hazard rate of 
the selection period. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper presents an analysis of vacancy duration data, using a simple 
test to distinguish between sequential and nonsequential employers' search. 
From this test it appears that employers search nonsequentially. They announce 
a vacancy, form a pool of applicants, start a selection process and piek the new 
employee from the pool. 
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Table 1. Estimation results model with flexible duration dependence 
ln(U/V) 0.17(2.4)** 
employment office 1 0.38(2.3) ** 
employment office 2 0.45(2.2) ** 
employment office 3 0.28(1.5) 
employment office 4 0.42(2.1)** 
metal and construction -0.15(1.4) 
services (sec. and higher) -0.22(2.3) ** 
10-50 employees -0.05 (0.5) 
50-100 employees -0.21 (2.0) ** 
> lOOemployees -0.12 (1.1) 
temporary job 0.28 (4.0) ** 
parttime job -0.15 (1.8) * 
intensive mediation 0.22(2.7)** 
2-4 weeks 0.58(6.0)** 
1-2 months 0.47 (4.4) ** 
2-3months 0.48(3.2)** 
> 3 months 0.39(2.1)** 
constant -2.75 (10.5) ** 
loglikelihood -533.8 
Explanatory note: absolute t-values in parentheses; ** (*) denotes significance on a 5% (10%) level. 
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Table 2. Estimation results two period model 
X (First period) 
without with 
heterogeneity heterogeneity 
0.60(2.3)** 0.50(1.8)* 
0.49(0.9) 0.42(0.9) 
0.23 (0.2) 0.23 (0.3) 
1.08(1.4) 0.90(1.3) 
3.43 (2.2) ** 3.57(2.5)** 
-1.96(3.3)** -2.01 (2.4) ** 
0.00(0.0) 
0.10(0.0) 
ln(U/V) 
employment office 1 
employment office 2 
employment office 3 
employment office 4 
Mi 
Mr Mi 
ff 
6 (second period) 
ln(U/V) 0.06(0.4) 0.04(0.3) 
metal and construction -0.18(0.8) -0.18(0.7) 
services (sec. and higher) -0.22(1.2) -0.28(1.3) 
10-50 employees -0.06(0.4) -0.05(0.3) 
50-100 employees -0.29(1.2) -0.25(0.9) 
> 100 employees -0.11(0.5) -0.14(0.6) 
temporary job 0.37(2.4)** 0.44(2.0)** 
parttime job -0.19(1.1) -0.21 (1.0) 
intensive mediation 0.19(1.1) 0.18(0.8) 
V\ -1.53(3.2)** -0.86(1.0) 
V?V\ -0.91(1.9)* 
T -0.03 (0.0) 
loglikelihood -528.0 -527.0 
Note: in the second estimation <r was not identified ex post, because jtfM; did not differ from 0 
significantly. 
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